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Transition from Inflation to Price Stability
ABSTRACT
Thispaper provides a detailed discussion of the real phenomena that
materialized in the stabilization per&od which followedthe German hyper—
inflation.Significant real dislocations arose after themonetary reform;
and these can be attributed to a government policywhich subsidized heavy
industry through the inflation taxproceeds.The "credibility problem"





(716) 275—4320The accelerating iniation rates of the past decade haveelicited
propoa1s to implement monetary policies which will eventuallystabilize the
price level,There seems to be a general agreement that the steady-state
costs of the current inflation rate are highand that the rate should be
reduced.1However, that additional substantial real costs mayarise because
of the transition has led some economists to prescribe monetarypolicies aimed
at reducing such costs through a gradual reductionof the inflationrate.2
Other economists, believing that the transition costs maybe low, suggest
policies designed rapidly to move to pricestability.3
The nature of the transition costs has strongimplications for the kind
of research input required for policy decisions intended toreduce inflation.
If transition costs are low, then one should seek toattain price stability
immediately, without requiring any additional knowledgeabout 'the steady-state
costs of various inflation rates.If the transition is costly, then there is
a tradeoff between transitional costsand steady-state costs.Since only
vague notions about the relativemagnitudes of these costs exist, a large-
scale, time-consuming research effort would have to precede anyserious policy
recommendation
Since there are many theories producing as manydifferent predictions
about the effects of transitional policies, siftingthrough them requires an
examination of historical episodes which display transitionsfrom inflation
5
to price stability.Of the recent empirical studies concerning the real
effects of such policy shifts, Sargent's (1980) examinationof the post-World
War I hyperinflations is mostprovocative.6Sargent argues that these extreme-2-
inflations we;re b;rought to suddenends without substantial negtiyereal effects.
This ending suggests that thetransitional costs ofa. suddenchange toaprice
stabilizing policymay be quite low relative to the efficiencylosses arising
from current inflationrates.If true, this builds added confidencein a
recommendation immediatelyto end the inflation, perhaps obviatingthe need
to study more intensely the magnitudeand nature of transitiQn costs before
making a policy recommendation.
In this paper I will providea detailed discussion about the real
phenomena which followed theGerman stabilization.I reach conclusions that
are different from those of Sargent;there is substantial evidenceof large scale
negative real effects in the aftermathof the German hyperinflation.,7Such
effects were probably duemore to the. extreme nature of the inflationand its
other attendant distortionsthan to the nature of itstermination.The
costs that did arisewere due to a policy of subsidizingthe capital goods
industry through theinflation tax revenue.When this source ofrevenue
was terminated, a major reallocationof resources among industrieswas re-
quired; it was thereallocation that generatedthe transitional costs.Thus,
the al].ocative effectsof monetary decelerationhad little to do with theprice
or expectational stickinessthat cai be found incurrent discussions.Rather,
they stemmed froma close relationship betweenthe inflation and othergovern-
mentally imposed distortions.Regardless of theirsource since the costs did
arise, the Germancase cannot serve as evidence thatthere may be an easyescape
from the current lack ofconfidence in particulartransitional policyrecomnlenda_
tions.
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they stemmed from a closerelationship between the inflation and othergovern-
mentally imposed distortions. Regardless oftheir source since the costs did
arise, the German case cannot serveas evidence that there may be aneasy escape
from the current lack of confidencein particular transitional policyrecomnlenda_
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The German Case
In analyzing themonetary reforms of thepost—World War I hyperinflations,
Sargent (1980) emphasizedcommon features which emergedin the successfulprice
stabilizations.Basic reformswere the central banks'refusals to supplygovern.-
en5 creditdemands andgovernients' changes offiscal policy to regimesin
which debt would bebacked by futuretaxes.The implementationof these policies
triggered sudden shiftsfrom extreme inflationto price stability.8These cases
provjdedramatjc evidencethat economiescan achieve rapid shifts tostable prices.
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The German Case
In analyzing the monetary reformsof the post-World War I hyperinflations
Sargent (1980) emphasized common featureswhich emerged in the successfulprice
stabilizations. Basic reformswere the central banks' refusals tosupply govern-
efl5 credit demands andgovernments' changes of fiscalpolicy to regimes in
which debt would be backedby future taxes. The implementationof these policies
triggered sudden shifts from extreme
inflation to price stability.8 Thesecases
provide dramatic evidence that
economies can achieve rapid shifts tostable prices.-3-
However, in additionSargent, citing dataon industrial pzoductionor
unemployient, suggests thatthese reformswere accomplished with sma.li. trani-
tional costs,In this section I willpresent evidence which indicatesthat
large trnsjtjona1costs materialized in theGerman case, assuming the form
of ifl1ustrial productiondeclines and unemploymentincreases.The economic
decline which I willdescribe did notappear in the immediate aftermathof
the reform, the periodwhich Sargent examined;rather, beginningan era called
the "RationalizationPeriod," it arose 1-1/2years after the November, 1923
reform.Intuition suggests thattransition costs shouldoccurimmediately
after a reform andpersist until the stable-pricesteady state has been
attained.I will argue that thisintuition should besuspended in the German
case; a number of factorspostponed the German transition.
The section is subdividedinto two subsections.rnthefirst I will
describe the organizationof industry and ofoutput in both the inflationary
period and the rationalizationperiod.In the second I willexamine the factors
which postponed thetransitional costs; alsoI will both measure thelength of
time that the lack of"credibility" was importantand present evidence indicating
that agents fully believedin the price stabilizationpolicy before the transi-
tional costs materialized.In my opinion, thisevidence implies thatagents'
correctly predicting andrecognizing new policyregimes is not sufficientto
prevent large transitionalcosts.In the second subsectionI also will gauge
the extent of thetransitional costs andsuggest that the transitionwas still
in progress whenthe German economywas overwhelmed by the GreatDepression.
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The Organization of Output and Industry
To detenine how the structure of the German economy changed jn moving
toward a stable-price steady state, it is necessary first to study thestructure
that prevailed duri,ng the inflation.The development of the German economy was
molded not only by the inflationary money creation policy, but also bya port-
folio of other policies which were tied intimately to the inflation.
One of the inefficiencies that arises in an inflationary period stems
from the reduction in real balances; capital and laborresources must be
substituted from other activities to replace money.The economys capacity
both to consume and produce is reduced.Although the reduction of real
balances impinges on all transactions, I will confine the following imp1e
discussion to its effects on production in order to focus the exposition.
In Figure I, the curve DAC is a production possibility frontier





A cost of inflation can be depicted as a movement from A, the efficient
output combination with a zero inflation rate, to B, the efficient output
Figure I
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conlbinatiQn when the inflationrate is high.Such a cost 'qrrnsa cQmponent
of tha.t which j,s measuredby theusual. triangle underthe real ba1nce demand
curve.In essence, the productionpossibility curve shifts inwardwith the
destructi.on of real balances.If these production possibilityfrontiers were
homothetic, there wouldbe no change in theratios of different goods produced,
providing that the inflationdid not affect relative prices.However, an
increasing inflationrate may automatically triggerother distortions through
its association withthe economy's other institutionalarrangements,Fischer
and Modigliani (1978)and Fischer (1980) studiedtheseautomatic distortions,
suggesting that theymay substantially increase thecosts of steady state
inflation.Such distortionsmay manifest themselves througha relative price
shifi; in the context.uf Figure I, the reiaiveprice of investment goodsmay
rise,moving the compositionof output from B to J.
I will now argue that suchautomatic distortionsdid affect the relative
prices and structure ofthe German economy; thenI will discuss thesources of
these distortions.In Table 1,i present evidence that substantialmovements
in relative pricesoccurred in the German inflation;causing production to shift
toward investment goods.9The entries in the tableare the ratio of the whole-.
sale price index to thecost of living index.Included in the WPIare both
investment goods andgoods destined forconsumption, so the ratio probably
understates the order ofmagnitude of the relativeprice shift between
consumer goods and investment goods.In the first half of 1921,there was
a very mild deflation,so the relative price that prevailedfrom January to
July can be interpretedas the relationship that might prevailwith a stable
—5-.
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I will now argue that such automaticdistortions did affect the relative
prices and structure of the Germaneconomy; then I will discuss the sources of
these distortions. In Table I, ipresent evidence that substantial movements
in relative prices occurred in theGerman inflation; causing production to shift
toward investment goods.9 The entries inthe table are the ratio of the whole-
sale price index to the cost ofliving index. Included in the WPI are both
investment goods and goods destined forconsumption, so the ratio probably
understates the order of magnitude of therelative price shift between
consumer goods and investment goods. In the firsthalf of 1921, there was
a very mild deflation, so the relativeprice that prevailed from January to
July can be interpreted as therelationship that might prevail with a stable-6-
price level,The inflation resumed in August 1921, continuing at increasing
rates until November 1923.Iiiunediately, the ratio of theWPI totheCLI sub-
stantially increased, more than doubling in a number of months in 1922 and
1923.When the inflation ended, the ratio immediately fell to the level which
had prevailed in the first half of 1921, remaining there for the next twoyears.
Again, to focus the exposition, let us assume that the Stolper—Samuelson
theorem is applicable.Then there should be a predictable relationship among
movements in goods relative prices, outputs, relative factor prices, absolute
factor incomes, and factor intensity changes in each industry.In partiuclar,
if the investment goods industry was relatively capital intensive, this shift
in the relative price of goods should have been associated not only with a
rise in the rent/wage ratio but also with a decline in the absolute income
of labor.There is sonie indication that the investment goods industry was
capital intensive)0Table II, with data on the number of persons employed
in each industry, indicates to some extent thatresources flowed into invest-
ment goods industries during the inflation and into consumer goods industries
after the reform.11In Table III,I present some evidence on the movement
of real wages0 During the hyperinflation those declined substantially, rising
steadily after the reform.Numerical evidence on the return to capital is
not as readily available as wage data.However, the accounts of the period
seem to indicate thatprofits were very large during the inflationary
period, especially in the investment goods industries)2New investment
flowed into the capital goods industry along with labor.Both Bresciani-
Turroni (pp. 201-2) and Graham (p. 242) discuss the expansion of
plant that proceeded during the inflation0Due to the very
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Table1
RtiQQf Yholesa1ep.j,ce.IndextoCost f LivAngIndex
Date 1921 19221 19231 19242f_______
Jan. .97 1.43 1.91 .89 .94
Feb. .95 1.34 1.62 .94 .94
Mar. .94 1.46 1.33 .94 .93
Apr. .94 1.43 1.38 .94 .92
May .94 1.32 1.67 .92 .93
June .94 1.31 1.95 .89 .92
July .91 1.45 1.53 .93 .90
Aug 1.14 1.92 1.24 .94 .90
Sept. 1.20 1.64 1.23 1.00 .91
Oct. 1.30 1.97 1.49 .93 .90
Nov. 1.5]. 1.98 .85 .94 .92
Dec. 1.41 1.67 .81 .97 .91
1
Source:Statistjschs Reichsamt,Zahlen zur Ge1tentrertur
,P.21, p. 33, The CLI used in all yearsis t at w icexc u esousing, which
was price controlled.The index in gold was multiplied by100
and divided into the WPI.
2
SourceStatistisches Reichsamt,Jahrbuch für das DeutscheReich, 1924, p. 260, p. 265.Indexes fioit—
3Source:Statjstjsches Reichsmt, Jahrbuchfür das Dtsche Rei5
p. 238, p. 301.Anewëomputatlonmethod was used by tne
Statistiches Reichsatto compute these indices.
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Table II
Employment in Capital Goods and Consumer Goods Industries*
Year
Capital Goods Industries Consumer Goods Industries
Persons Employed % Persons Employed %
1907 5,960,973 71.5 2,375,177 28.5
1913 6,732,354 70.4 2,829,632 29.6
1919 5,628,566 73.8 1,993,907 26.2









1925* 6,036,000 57.0 4,577,000 43.0
Source;1907-1924,Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunkturforschurg, 1926, Heft 2, p. 47.
*Source: Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunkturforschurg, 1927, Heft 4, p. 18.The
organization producing the 1925 data was different from that which
produced the data prior to 1925.Hence, there is some discrepancy.
The employment figwres reported by this source are 6.7 million in
the capital goods industry and 59 million in the consumer goods
industry.The 1926 source does not account for the category
"wo1ng, Kultur, Luxus."Since the 1927 source includes this
category among consumer goods I have subtracted the workers in
this group (L98 million) from the consumer goods total for 1925.
In addition, the earlier source includes paper and leather goods
among consumer goods while tne later source includes them among
ca?italgoods.Hence,for l25, I have moved the workers in
these categories (631 thousafld)into consumer goods.
-8-
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Table III























































































Sources:1922-23 data are from StatistischesReichsamt,Zahlen zur
Geldentwertung in Deutschland,p. 42.
The 1924-25 data are taken from Vierte.ljahrsheftezur
K-onjunkturforschung, 1 Jahrgang,.1926,p. 61.These data
are reported inIchsniarks/week.However, since the 1913
weekly goldmark wage was reported by theStatistisches
Reichsamtreference, the index can be computed by forming
theratio of the twowagesbecause 1 Reichsmark =1goldmark.
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Table III
Index of Weekly Real Wages
(1913 =100)
















































Sources: 1922-23 data are from StatistischesReichsamt, Zahlenzur
Geldentwertungin Deutsch].and, p. 42.
The 1924-25 data are taken from Vierte.ljahrshefte zur
K.onjunkturforschung, 1 Jahrgang,.l926, p. 61. These data
are reported iniIchsnjarks/week. However, since the 1913
weekly goldmark wage was reported by the Statistisches
Reichsamtreference, the index can be computed byforming
theratioof the two wages because 1 Reichsmark =1goidmark.-9a-
*In International Labour Office (1925), the reported indexes are lower for
1924 (p.79) than reported here.However, the pattern of growth is similar.
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*In International Labour Office (1925), the reported indexes are lower for
1924 (p.79) than reported here. However, the pattern of growth is similar.-10-
lowwage-rental ratio the new investmentcongealed in plants employing labor-
intensivetechniques.13
In additionto the shifts in prices, outputcomposition, and resource
allocation, a change in theorganization of industry occurred during the
inflation)4German industry had always been somewhathorizontally integrated;
cartelswere commonprior to the inflation.However4 during the inflation
industries both integrated verticallyaid formed enormouscombines of wholly
disparatefirms; the combines controlledvast sectors of the economy15In
part, the purpose for constructing suchorganizations was to avoid the use
of money by employing internalaccounting and payments systems.16
The distortion which, in combinationwith the inflation, determined
thi5 organization of output andindustry was the subsidization of the invest-
ment goods industry with theinflation tax revenue.The subsidies derived
from the money creation assumeda number of forms.First, capital goods
industries were supported directlythrough the government's budget.In
addition to government enterprisessuch as the railway, the government sub—
5idized shipbuilding and electricalpowergeneration)7Second, beginning in
1922, the Reichbank began directlyto discount the bills of private business.
The annual discount rateswere 6 percent in July1922, 18 percent in April.
1923, 30 percent in August 1923,and 90 percent in September 1923.The in-.
flation rates prevailing at thesedates were at such high levels that onlya
negligible percentage ofa loan's real value ever was repaid.18The large -
combines,organized around the basic capitalgoods industries, had special
access to such loans for financing their commercialactivities, thereby
effectively receiving large subsidiesfor their inputs.Some idea of the
relative values of the Reichbank loans to thegovernment and to industry
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can be gained from Table IV.Finally, the Reichsbank, unable to print
currency fast enough to satisfy demand, licensed a number of institutions,
including private firms, to print "emergencymoney' in order to meet their
pressing needs for cash.The large combines had an advantage in circulating
19 suchcash in payment for their inputs because of theirlarge size. This
policy subsidized both the formation of largeconglomerates and the production
of capital goods.2°
In summary, the combination of the inflation with othergovernment and
central bank policies caused new capital investment and laborto shift into
the investment goods industries, substantially increasedthe amount of fixed
capital utilizing labor intensive technology, andproduced an environment in
whiUgigancic, centralizedindustrial organizations couid formaxtdsurvive.
Also,itshifted the relative prices of goods and factors of productionand
destroyedreal balances by generatinginflationary expectations..That these
expectationsandprice distortions ended with the reform did not indicatethat
the transition from an inflationary environmentto a steady-state stable price
environment had also terminated.Rather, the transition continued until the
technical nature of capital, the quantity of capital,and the organization of
industry returned to norrnal
The Rentenmark, the Dawes Loan, and the Rationalizationof Industry
TheRenterunark
The monetary reform was implemented in November, 1923.Since Sargent
discusses the event extensively, Iwillreview only some relevant details.
A new bank, the Rentenbank, was created with thepower to issue Rentenmarks
in limited amounts; the Rentenmarkwas a new form of paper money but its value
remainedclose to one goldmark (4.2goldrnarks =$1).Half of the Rentenmarks
(1.2billion) were loaned to thegovernment to finance its deficits in transition
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New Discounts of the Reichsbank (MillionGoldmarks)a
Sources:Jan. 1922 -Oct.1923Statistisches Reichsamt, Zahien zur Geldentwertung in
Deutschland, p. 52,p. 23.




bThjsamount is the sum of the changes in the following asset categories:Advances,





of month exchange rates.
understated.
new nominal discounted bills were converted to gold values using
From May to November 1923, conversions were performed with end




































































































New Discounts of the Reichsbank (Million Goldmarks)a
Sources: Jan. 1922 -Oct.1923 Statistisches Reichsamt, Zahien zur Geldentwertung in
Deutschland, p. 52, P. 23.




bThjs amount is the sum of the changes in the following asset categories: Advances,
Rentenmark Discounts and Advances, Bills of Exchange and Checks, and Rentenmark Bills of
Exchange and Checks.
*
Prior to May, 1923, new nominal discounted bills were converted to gold values using
mid-month exchange rates. From May to November 1923, conversions were performed with end




































































































to a balanced budget; some Rentenmarks (ultimately .8 billion)were loaned
to the Reichsbank.The government drastically cut its expenditures and raised
taxes.On November 16, the Reichsbank stopped discountinggovernment bills;
and the government extinguished its entire debtto the Reichsbank, using part
of its Rentenmark loan to repurchase the debt.The Reichsbank announced that
after November 22 it would no longer exchangepaper marks for emergency money.
However, the Reichsbank, basing its actionson a real bills doctrine,
continued to discount private bills ata rapid rate.The real values of its
new loans to industry and agriculture in the five months after the reformex—
ceeded those of the loans during the inflation,as indicated in Table IV.
The Reichsbank's acquisition of these assetswas reflected in an increased
circulation of papermarks in addition to the Rentenmarkscirculated after the
reform.Since the price level and exchange rate were relatively stable after
the reform, the added currency representedan increase in realbalances.2'
For the period after the reform, totalcurrency in circulation and its components
are presented in Table V.Notice that currency in circulation more than doubled
in the first six months after the reform.
The effects of this post-reform monetary policyon the price level can
be determined by Table VI.After an initial decline in prices, the inflation
resumed in the spring of 1924 ata substantial annual rate.This new inflation
so alarmed the Reichsbank that it suddenly stopped its discounting ofnew
private bills after the first week in April, 1924.22
Expectations and "Credibility"
The effect of this policy shift on inflationary expectationscan be
determined by examining the interest rates for daymoney, month money, and
gold bonds in Table VII.The rates for day money and month money were nominal;
those for the gold bondswere real since the bonds and their coupons were
denominated in gold.23Although there were differences with the term and risk
-13-
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and the government extinguished its entire debt to the Reichsbank, usingpart
of its Rentenmark loan to repurchase the debt. The Reichsbank announced that
after November 22 it would no longer exchange paper marks foremergency money.
However, the Reichsbank, basing its actions on a real bills doctrine,
continued to discount private bills at a rapid rate. The real values of its
new loans to industry and agriculture in the five months after the reform ex-
ceeded those of the loans during the inflation, as indicated in Table IV.
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circulation of papermarks in addition to the Rentenmarks circulated after the
reform. Since the price level and exchange rate were relatively stable after
the reform, the added currency represented an increase in real balances.21
For the period after the reform, total currency in circulation and itscomponents
are presented in Table V. Notice that currency in circulation more than doubled
in the first six months after the reform.
The effects of this post-reform monetary policy on the price level can
be determined by Table VI. After an initial decline in prices, the inflation
resumed in the Spring of 1924 at a substantial annual rate. This new inflation
so alarmed the Reichsbank that it suddenly stopped its discounting of new
private bills after the first week in April, 1924.22
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December, 1923 120.0 142.8
























1Thejump in the indices between December, 1924 and January, 1925
is due to the introduction of a new computation method for both indices.
2End ofmonth for 1924.Monthly average for 1925.
3Excludeshousing.
Sources: Statistis1chesReichsamt, Jahrbuch für das DeutscheReich,
1924/25, p. 260,p. 265.









December, 1923 120.0 142.8
























1The jumpinthe indices between December, 1924 and January, 1925
is due to the introduction of a new computation method for both indices.
of month for 1924. Monthly average for 1925.
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Sources: StatistischesReichsamt, Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich,
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January,1924 87.6 28.3 7.8 January,1926 7.1 9.0 7.5
February 34.9 22.6 7.8 February 6.0 7.4 7.0
March 33.1 30.0 9.2 March 5.7 6.8 6.6
April 45.5 44.5 10.5 April 4.6 6.0 6.1
May 27.8 44.3 12.8 May 4.8 5.9 6.1
June 22.6 32.6 13.3 June 4.8 5.8 6.2
July 16.8 22.9 11.2 July 5.0 5.8 6.1
August 17.1 18.8 9.3 August 5.0 5.9 6.0
September 15.0 16.8 8.3 September 5.1 6.2 6.0
October 14.1 14.4 8.4 October 5.0 6.3 5.9
November 13.0 13.8 8.3 November 4.8 6.4 5.8
December 11.1 12.6 8.3 December 6.0 7.4 5.5
January,1925 10.0 11.3 7.4 January,1927 4.3 6.3 5.4
February 10.6 11.9 7.4 February 5.4 5.3
March 9.0 11.3 7.2 March 5.1 7.3 5.4
April 8.5 10.1 7.3 April 5.8 7.1 5.5
May 8.8 10.5 7.4 May 6.3 7.6 5.6
June 8.8 10.7 7.8 June 6.0 8.2 5.8
July 9.5 10.9 8.0
August 9.0 10.8 8.3
September 8.9 10.8 8.2
October 9.4 10.8 8.0
November 8.5 10.7 8.2
December 8.2 10.3 8.2
1Annualpercentage rates.
Source:Vierteljahreshefte zur Konjunkturforschung 1926/27, Heft 2, p. 92 and

















January,1924 87.6 28.3 7.8 January,1926 7.1 9.0 7.5
February 34.9 22.6 7.8 February 6.0 7.4 7.0
March 33.1 30.0 9.2 March 5.7 6.8 6.6
April 45.5 44.5 10.5 April 4.6 6.0 6.1
May 27.8 44.3 12.8 May 4.8 5.9 6.1
June 22.6 32.6 13.3 June 4.8 5.8 6.2
July 16.8 22.9 11.2 July 5.0 5.8 6.1
August 17.1 18.8 9.3 August 5.0 5.9 6.0
September 15.0 16.8 8.3 September 5.1 6.2 6.0
October 14.1 14.4 8.4 October 5.0 6.3 5.9
November 13.0 13.8 8.3 November 4.8 6.4 5.8
December 11.1 12.6 8.3 December 6.0 7.4 5.5
January,1925 10.0 11.3 7.4 January,1927 4.3 6.3 5.4 O kr,, rsr tA Cii A '7 Ai.' nl
rel)Lud.Ly
.—a.'+ r a... i'
March 9.0 11.3 7.2 March 5.1 7.3 5.4
April 8.5 10.1 7.3 April .5.8 7.1 5.5
May 8.8 10.5 7.4 May 6.3 7.6 5.6
June 8.8 10.7 7.8 June 6.0 8.2 5.8
July 9.5 10.9 8.0
August 9.0 10.8 8.3
September 8.9 10.8 8.2
October 9.4 10.8 8.0
November 8.5 10.7 8.2
December 8.2 10.3 8.2
'Annualpercentage rates.
Source: Vierteljahreshefte zur Konjunkturforschung 1926/27, Heft 2, p. 92 and
1927, Heft 3, p. 112.-17-
associated with these assets, the difference between the nominal and real rates
should reflect at least the order of magnitude of the anticipated inflation
rate.In the spring of 1924, the differential in interest rates indicates an
anticipated annual inflation rate of 20-30 percent.Within eight months after
the Reichsbank imposed its credit restrictions, the difference fell to a level
reflecting a negligible anticipated inflation rate.
These interest rate differences can also be used to address the question
of the "credibility' of the central bank's new policy.Even in the winter of
1924 agents apparently believed that prices would rise at low annual percentage
rates relative to those that had prevailed in the hyperinflation.Given that
prices had risen at rates of 500 percent per week in October 1923, the 1924
interest rates indicate a dramatic and rapid shift in agents' beliefs about
monetarypolicy.24Agents also learned rapidly about the final shift to the
stable price policy.It seems reasonable to claim that agents in the German
economy believed in a stable price policy regime by April 1925.Thus, the
length of time during which "credibility" may have been an issue was at most
1-1/2 years, starting in November 1923.
Real Effects of Reforni andCreditStringenc
While 1922 was by all accounts a boom year, industrial production in 1923
was depressed, as shown in Table VIII.In the last half of 1923, unemployment
grew substantially as indicated in Table X.It is difficult to isolate the
cause of this depression in output.In January 1923, the French and Belgians
occupied the Ruhr, the industrial heartland of Germany; and the "Passive
Resistance" that ensued disrupted production both in the Ruhr and in the rest
of the country.Simultaneously with the advent of the reform, the "Passive
Resistance" ended.Therefore, the revival of output in early 1924 can be
attributed either to the end of the inflation or to the end of the Ruhr struggle.
-17-
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prices had risen at rates of 500 percent per week in October 1923, the 1924
interest rates indicate a dramatic and rapid shift in agents' beliefs about
monetary policy.24 Agents also learned rapidly about the final shift to the
stable price policy. It seems reasonable to claim that agents in the German
economy believed in a stable price policy regime by April 1925. Thus, the
length of time during which "credibility" may have been an issue was at most
1-1/2 years, starting in November 1923.
Real Effects of Reform andCreditStringency
While 1922 was by all accounts a boom year, industrial production in 1923
was depressed, as shown in Table VIII. In the last half of 1923, unemployment
grew substantially as indicated in Table X. It is difficult to isolate the
cause of this depression in output. In January 1923, the French and Belgians
occupied the Ruhr, the industrial heartland of Germany; and the "Passive
Resistance" that ensued disrupted production both in the Ruhr and in the rest
of the country. Simultaneously with the advent of the reform, the "Passive
Resistance" ended. Therefore, the revival of output in early 1924 can be
attributed either to the end of the inflation or to the end of the Ruhr struggle.-18-
Table VIII











1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
January 51.2 83.1 71.8 91.4 98.8 95.2
February 58.3 85.4 72.2 92.0 102.0 90.9
March 64.0 86.572.5 96.0 105.0 99.0
April 76.0 868 72.3 98.8 104.7 108.3
May 59.1 86.9 75.0 103.2 103.0 109.1
June 70.6 85.3 77.0 101.9 103.0 109.8
July 69.3 83.4 76.1 101.2 104.4 104.7
August 68.2 81.6 80.2 102.4 102.3 103.3
September 72.7 82.7 83.0 104.4 102.2 101.8
October 76.1 80.4 85.9 104.4 98.1 101.3
November 81.0 81.2 90.4 105.9 84.6 100.1
December 82.0 75.6 90.7 100.0 91.9 95.5
Sources:Annual data are taken from Graham,p. 287.Graham took
the data from Bulletin de la Statistigue Generale de la
France.
Monthly data are from Vierteljahreshefte zur Konjunkturforschung,
1929, 4 Jahrgang, Heft 4, Teil A.p. 43.
-18—
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1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
January 51.2 83.1 71.8 91.4 98.8 95.2
February 58.3 85.4 72.2 92.0 102.0 90.9
March 64.0 86.572.5 96.0 105.0 99.0
April 76.0 86..8 72.3 98.8 104.7 108.3
May 59.1 86.9 75.0 103.2 103.0 109.1
June 70.6 85.3 77.0 101.9 103.0 109.8
July 69.3 83.4 76.1 101.2 104.4 104.7
August 68.2 81.6 80.2 102.4 102.3 103.3
September 72.7 82.7 83.0 104.4 102.2 101.8
October 76.1 80.4 85.9 104.4 98.1 101.3
November 81.0 81.2 90.4 105.9 84.6 100.1
December 82.0 75.6 90.7 100.0 91.9 95.5
Sources: Annual data are taken from Graham, p. 287. Graham took
the data from Bulletin de la Statistigue Generale de la
France.
Monthly data are from Vierteljahreshefte zur Konjunkturforschung,
1929, 4 Jahrgang, Heft 4, Tell A. p. 43.;-19-.
Table IX













3)Union Mcmbcrs 7 7r ,%tlI.% .J, V..,.., , UUU
Source:Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunkturforschung,(1927,
Heft 4,p. 20, p. 128), (1926, Heft 2, p. 56).
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Table IX
German Population Statistics, 1925
1) Total Population
2) Employed










3) Union Members 7 7r ,%tlI.%
.), V..,.., , UVU
Source: Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunkturforschung, (1927,
Heft 4, p. 20, p. 128), (1926, Heft 2,p. 56).-20-
Table X










1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
January 4.2 26.5 8.1 22.6 16.5 11.2 19.4
February 5.2 25.1 7.3 22.0 15.5 10.4 22.3
March 5.6 16.6 21.4 11.5 9.2: 16.9
April 7.0 10.4 4.3 18.6 8.9 6.9 11.1
May 6.2 8.6 3.6 18.1 7.0 6.3 9.1
June 4.1 10.5 3.5 18.1 6.3 6.2 8.5
July 3.5 12.5 3.7 17.7 5.5 6.3 8.6
August 6.3 12.4 4.3 16.7 5.0 6.5 8.9
September 9.9 10.5 4.5 15.2 4.6 6.6 9.6
October 19.1 8.4 5.8 14.2 4.5 7.8 10.9
November 23.4 7.3 10.7 14.2 7.4 9.5 13.7
December 28.2 8.1 19.4 16.7 12.9 16.7 20.1
Sources:1912-1923 -TheWorkers Standard of Life in Countries with
preciated Currency, P. 21.
Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunkturforschung (1926, Heft1, p. 60),
Tj27 Hét 4 p j23). (1928, Heft 1, TellB, p. 73),
(1928, Heft 4, Tell B p, 71),
-20-
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preciated Currency, P. 21.
Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunkturforschung (1926, Heft 1,p. 60),
(i27 Heft ?Pj23). (1928, Heft 1, Tell B, p. 73),
(1928, Heft 4, Teil B, p, 71),—21—
Table XI
Persons Collecting Unemployment Compensation
(Thousands)
l24 1925—_
1926 1927 1928 1929
January —— 593 2031 1827 1333 2246
February —- 540 2056 1696 1238 2461
March —— 466 1942 1121 lOll 1899
April 572 320 1781 870 729 1126
May 402 233 1744 649 629 808
June 426 195 1741 540 611 723
July 526 197 1652 453 564 710
August 588 231 1548 404 574 726
September513 266 1394 355 577 749
October 435 364 1308 340 671 889
November 437 673 1370 605 1030 1200
December 536 1499 1749 1188 1702 1774
Source:Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunkturforschung, (1926/7,
Heft2, p. 99), (l927 Heft 2,p. 122), (1928, Heft 2,
Tell B, p. 85), (1929, Heft 4, Teil B,p. 71).
Statistisches Jahrbuch fUr das Deutsche Reich,1927.
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Industrial production rapidly approachedits 1922 levels until the stable
price regime began in earnest in April1924.At that point output collapsed
to the rate prevailing early in theyear and unemployment increased.Also,
large numbers of firms went bankruptin the summer of 1924, as shown in TableXII.
The first cycle after themonetary reform had a period of eight months
and a fairly large amplitude.During the cycle agent's expectationsof infla—
tion seem to have been correct, and thecomposition of output began to shift
with the relative price shift.Real wages rose steadily, attaining their 1913
level by the summer of 1924.However, the technical nature of capital and
the organization of industry didnot substantially change in this cycle.The
labor intensive machinery and the industrialstructure spawned by the inflation
survived through the continued financingof the Reichsbank; and the months of




The revival from the Reichsbank's creditrestrictions began in the fall
of 1924 with the influx of foreign creditsmade available by the Dawes Loan.
At this time the Reichsmark replaced thepapermark as the •1eg.l tender oney
and the Reichsbank resumed new discounts of private bills.26The Dawes Plan
required Germany to place legal restrictionson the Reichsbank to insure the
stability of the new currency and fixeda schedule and method for reparations
payments.27Also, an official loan of 800 million gold markswas made to
Germany in 1924; and substantial private foreign loans and directinvestment
flowed into the country.28
These foreign loans stimulated a reduction in unemployment and a recovery
of production that peaked in May 1925, an expansion of nine months.Writers
on this period share the common opinion that the loans served once again to
-22-
Industrial production rapidly approached its 1922 levels untilthe stable
price regime began in earnest in April 1924. At that pointoutput collapsed
to the rate prevailing early in theyear and unemployment increased. Also,
large numbers of firms went bankrupt in the summer of 1924,as shown in Table XII.
The first cycle after the monetary reform hada period of eight months
and a fairly large amplitude. During the cycleagent's expectations of infla-.
tion seem to have been correct, and the composition ofoutput began to shift
with the relative price shift. Realwages rose steadily, attaining their 1913
level by the summer of 1924. However, the technical nature ofcapital and
the organization of industry did not substantiallychange in this cycle. The
labor intensive machinery and the industrial structurespawned by the inflation
survived through the continued financing of the Reichsbank; and themonths of
credit restriction in the spring and summer of 1924were not sufficient to
remove them.25
The Dawes Loan
The revival from the Reichsbank's credit restrictionsbegan in the fall
of 1924 with the influx of foreign credits made availableby the Dawes Loan.
At this time the Reichsmark replaced the papermarkas the •lega.l tender oney
and the Reichsbank resumed new discounts of private bills.26 The Dawes Plan
required Germany to place legal restrictions on the Reichsbank to insure the
stability of the new currency and fixed a schedule and method for reparations
payments.27 Also, an official loan of 800 milliongold marks was made to
Germany in 1924; and substantial private foreign loans and direct investment
flowed into the country.28
These foreign loans stimulated a reduction in unemployment and a recovery
of production that peaked in May 1925, an expansion of nine months. Writers












1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 —--------------------------------
January 140 24 31 760 2013 473 753 February 123 17 41 700 1920 457 706 March 151 30 68 744 1871
April 107 45 138 660 1302 403
778
619 May 95 32 322 755 1046 451
June 91 35 579 709 913




663 August 59 13 855 718 493 395
September 45 9 817 887 467 355
October 43 15 520 1139 485 455
551
November 34 8 599 1320 453 582
691
December 39 17 572 1598 427 605
687
Source:Annual data and monthly data for 1922-23,Graham, p. 280.
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January 140 24 31 760 2013 473 753
February 123 17 41 700 1920 457 706 March 151 30 68 744 1871
April 107 45 138 660 1302 403
778
619
May 95 32 322 755 1046 451
June• 91 35 579 709 913
July 81 18 1173 797 701 418
765
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August 59 13 855 718 493 395 547
September 45 9 817 887 467 355
October 43 15 520 1139 485 455
November 34 8 599 1320 453
691
December 39 17 572 1598 427 605
687
Source: Annual data and monthly data for 1922-23,Graham, p. 280.
Monthly data, 1924-28: Funk, p. 122, p. 165, p. 169,p. 173, p. 197.-24—
postpone the reorganization of capital and industry to states consistent
with a steady state stable price environment, though the mechanism through
which this delay occurred is not clear.29For a period of six months in this
interregnum, unemployment reached much lower levels than at any time during
thenextten years.
The RationalizatIon of Industry
The transition to the economic structure associated with a stable price
regime began finally in the summer of 1925.A number of huge combines
constructed during the inflation collapsed at this time; the most notable
liquidation was that in June, 1925 of the enormous organization formed by
Stinnes.The industrial reorganization was not confined only to the large
combines; vast numbers of firms formed in the inflation were forced into
bankruptcy at this time, as shown in Table XII.3°
From peak to trough industrial production declined by 20 percent in less
than a year as shown in Figure II.Unemployment reached 22 percent of union
members by 1926 anddidnot fall below 10 percent until the second quarter of
1927.
However, output did not decline as much as employment, and it recovered
much more rapidly.This resulted from the second aspect of rationalization,
the transformation of plant and equipment to techniques reflecting a greater
capital intensity.With the rise in real wages, much of the vast labor intensive
physical investment installed in the inflation proved to be inefficient.Large
amounts of recently contructed capital which had negative niarginal productivity
were scrapped, especially in the mining, steel, shipbuilding, cement, and
machinery industries.31The closing of inefficient plant and reorganization of
methods within the remaining plant rapidly increased labor productivity,
allowing output to increase faster than the fall in unemployment during the
-24—
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recovery.The rationalization movement continued for a number of years
beyond 1925, during which unemployment was always high by previous
32
standards.
Conclusion:Interpreting the German Episode
The German evidence can be interpreted in two different ways.One may
conclude that the 1925-6 downturn and the subsequent high unemployment were
intimately connected to the inflation and reform, embodying the economy's
transition process to a stable price steady state.On the other hand, one
may treat these later events as phenomena unconnected to the transition
process, presuming that the transition was completed in the first 1-1/2 years
after the reform.
While most authors writing about this period agree with the first
interpretation, this viewpoint generates the task of explaining why there was
a 1-1/2 year delay in observing the transition's negative realeffects.33
Explaining the lag by the credits granted to industry by the Reichsbank and
foreign lenders leaves unanswered the question of why industry used these
credits to maintain plants and organizations which were inefficient in a
stable price environment.In addition to the lag problem, the first
interpretation also creates the usual question of whether the transitional
monetary policy was optimal.Could some other policy have utilized more of
the unemployed resources during the transition?The mere appearance of un-
employed resources does not imply that the Reichsbank's policy wassub-optimal.34
Indeed, it appears to me that the inflation was sailing so fast out of control
in the fall of 1923 that the Reichsbank's only choice was to throw out as
heavy an anchor as possible, hoping it would catch hold of something solid.
The object to which the mark attached itself was the dollar.
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the unemployed resources during the transition? The mere appearance of un-
employed resources does not imply that the Reichsbank's policy was sub-optimal.34
Indeed, it appears to me that the inflation was sailing so fast out of control
in the fall of 1923 that the Reichsbank's only choice was to throw out as
heavy an anchor as possible, hoping it would catch hold of something solid.
The object to which the mark attached itself was the dollar.-26-
Maintaining the secondinterpretation of the German dataleaves one
with the problem of whythe organization of industry andofproduction spawned
by the inflation collapsedat this time.Also, the downturn was confinedto
Germany; none of the otherindustrialized countries experienceda similar cycle
in these years.
In general, I consider that theresults of this analysis imply that a
large burden is involved in studying optimaltransitional policies,35If the
costs of both steady-state inflation and the transitionto stable prices are
high, then detailed study of thenature of each cost is necessary before reliable
policy recommendations can be made.This is a discouraging prospect, filled with
the potential for endless disputes.Sargent attempted to cut through this
impasse with an observation thata sudden, resolute shift to a stable price
monetary regime can shift an economy atonce to a stable price steady state
at small cost.If it is true that the transitioncosts are low, then one
need not worry about studying the trade-offbetween transition costs and
inflation costs.However, the evidence that I have presented indicates that
there may have been large transitioncosts in the German case.
The German evidence also illuminates anotheraspect of this cost trade-
off issue.As a basis for arguing that the costs of steady-stateinflation
may be quite high, Fischer and Modigliani (1978) and Fischer(1980) have
added distortions in capital markets whichworsen as the inflation rate rises.
Such distortions may alter the nature ofthe capital stock from its stable
price state, thereby also making the transitioncosts higher.Therefore,
although the steady-state inflationcosts may be higher because of these
distortions, it may be desirable to implementa slower transition process.
Finally, on a more positive note, it appears from the German evidence
that the credibility" problem was not an important factor in the transition.
Inflationary expectations seem to have been consistently correct priorto the
realization of the large transitional costs.
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*1 am indebted to RobertBarro, Robert Hodrick, Robert King,and Michael
Schmid for useful comments.Support for this researchwas supplied through
NSF Grant # SES-7926807.
1Moreaccurately, a general direction ofresearch has been toward
determining the least painfulmethod to reduce the current inflationrates.
See e.g., Okun (1978), Taylor(1979), Sargent (1980), Fellner(1979, 1980),
McCallum (1980), Gordon (1981).
2Workingfrom entirely different frameworksthese include Okun (1978),
Perry (1978), Fellner (1979),Taylor (1980), Cagan (1980).
3Suchsuggestions are not readily found inthe writings of academic
economists.They seem confined tosome economists inthe policyrecom-
mendation and forecasting business.
4SeeLucas (1980) for discussion of thisgap in knowledge.
5Evenvery similar theories yield different conclusionsabout the effect
of sudden shifts to non—inflationarypolicies.For instance, a flexible price
model with a Lucas-type supply functionwould respond to such a change
differently in thecase of purely rational expectations from thecase of
Bayesian learning about thenew policy.
6Gordon(1981) has studied 14 different episodes,including the U.S.,
Great Britain, Germany, France,and Switerland, in which policieshaving
the effect of reducingthe inflation rate were implemented.Examining sub-
sequent movements in prices and realincome, he has found fairly large
negative real effects, especiallyfor the U.S. cases.
7Thebulk of Sargent's paperconcerns the steps followed to bring about
a sudden, successful stabilization rather thanthe real effects of such steps,
With this analysis I have littledisagreement,
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8With this shift in the rate of return on money, there was an increased
demand for real balances which was satisfied in each case by continued rapid
money creation on the part of central banks.These once and for all gains
in revenue were used to finance the governments until they could shift the
public finance regime.
9Graham(pp. 197-202) discusses the differential movements in the whole-
sale and cost of living price indices.The Statistisches Reichsamt (1925,
p. 21) also broke the WPI into "industry Inputs" and "Foods" through 1923.
Data for these categories in 1924 are available in Statistisches Reichsamt,
Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich, 1924,p. 265.The pattern of the
ritio of the "Industry Inputs9' price to the CLI price isidenticalto
that in Table 1.The pattern of the ratio of the "Industry Inputs" price
to the "Foods" price is erratic.High in 1920, this price ratio fell in
1921 and did not begin to rise until the end of 1922.The ratio reached its
highest level in 1923 and declined throughout 1924.
10Theindustries to which I refer as Capital Goods Industries are listed
in the references as "Produktionsmittel industrien."They consist primarily
of heavy industries: coal, electricity generation, steel and metals, chemical
products, construction materials, construction industries, machine construction,
and electrical installations.The consumer goods industries, listed as
MVerbrauchsguterindustrienu, consist of producers of food, drink, clothing,
cleaning, and tobacco.Due to data inconsistencies furniture, glassware,
kitchen utensils and luxury goods are excluded.
Some crude evidence that the investment good industry was capital
intensive is provided in Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunturforschung, 1927,
Heft 4, p. 18. n attempt was made to measure the amount of capital in
each industry in 1925 by measuring the total horsepower associated with
—2-
this shift in the rate of return on money, there was an increased
demand for real balances which was satisfied in each case by continued rapid
money creation on the part of central banks. These once and for all gains
in revenue were used to finance the governments until they could shift the
public finance regime.
9Graham (pp. 197-202) discusses the differential movements in the whole-
sale and cost of living price indices. The Statistisches Reichsamt (1925,
p. 21) also broke the WPI into "industry Inputs" and "Foods" through 1923.
Data for these categories in 1924 are available in Statistisches Reichsamt,
Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich, 1924, p. 265. The pattern of the
rtio of the "Industry Inputs" price to the CLI price is identical to
that in Table 1. The pattern of the ratio of the "Industry Inputs" price
to the "Foods" price is erratic. High in 1920, this price ratio fell in
1921 and did not begin to rise until the end of 1922. The ratio reached its
highest level in 1923 and declined throughout 1924.
10The industries to which I refer as Capital Goods Industriesare listed
in the references as "Produktionsmittel industrien." They consist primarily
of heavy industries: coal, electricity generation, steel and metals, chemical
products, construction materials, construction industries, machine construction,
and electrical installations. The consumer goods industries, listed as
MVerbrauchsguterindustriene, consist of producers of food, drink, clothing,
cleaning, and tobacco. Due to data inconsistencies furniture, glassware,
kitchen utensils and luxury goods are excluded.
Some crude evidence that the investment good industry was capital
intensive is provided in Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunturforschung, 1927,
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each industry in 1925 by measuring the total horsepower associated with—3—
it.For the investmentgoods industry, laboremployed was 6.7 million
persons and availablehorsepowerwas 13.6 million.For the consumption
goods industry,employment was 5.9million persons whilehorsepower was
4.5 million.Interpreting horsepoweras capital implies thatthe investment
goods industrywas relatively capitalintensive, at leastin 1925.
11Brescianj_Turroni(1937,p. 371) cites the samesource to make a
similar point.He does not includethe data for 1919,information which
destroys themonotonic rise of laborin the capital goodsindustry during the
inflation.However, therewas a large inflationin 1919.Bresciani_Turroni
(pp. 198-199) alsodescribes the flowof labor intoparticular heavy industries,
mentioning an opinionat the time thatthe shift inoutput compositionwas
without historicalprecedent.
12SeeBresciani_Turroni(pp. l96-98)or Graham(p.11, p. 181,p. 28.
13SeeAngell (1929,pp. 46-7).
141naddition to beinga monetary experiment,the German inflationwas
an experiment in theorganjzatjo ofindustry.In the course offour years the
economy shifted froma rather decentralizedto a very centralizedorganization
and back in theabsence of underlyingtechnological change.The driving factors
were the monetaryand subsidy policiesof the central bankand governmentsFor
some discussion ofthe details ofGerman industrialorganization see National
Industrial ConferenceBoard (1931), Brady(1933), or Feldman(1977).
15SeeAngell (pp. 4554)or Bresciani_Turroni(pp. 203-212).
16Thestructure ofmanagement and thenature of entrepreneurshipalso
changed substantially.Production andmarketing becamesecondary activities
relative to finance.Financialpersonnel, with the abilityto be creatively
short onmoney during inflation,seem to earn largerents during suchperiods.
See Bresciani...Turronipp. 295-2981
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17Bresciani-Turronj(p. 196); Graham(pp. 306-310).
18Bresciani-Turroni(pp. 75-78); Graham (pp. 61-66). By August 1923, a
constant value clause was added to the loans made by the Reichsbankto private
individuals.A borrower had to repay the nominal principal of a loan plus
an additional 80 percent of the depreciation of the principal in terms of
sterling.If the depieciation rate ofthemark were great enough and the
discount rate were low enough, as in the fall of 1923, the loans would still
represent a substantial subsidy.However, the borrower did take some risk
with. these loans; if the exchange rate depreciated faster than the price
level rose a borrower could have paid a large real rate.
19BrescIani-TurronI (p. 343,p. 209).The Reichsbank exchanged such
legally authorized emergency money at a rate of 1 paprmark for 1 mark of
emergency money.Schaclit (1927, p. 106) estimates that the total amount of
emergency money in circulation at the end of 1923 equalled the entireReichsbank
note issue.
20Why this combination of subsidies should have affected output, relative
prices, and wage-rental ratios exactly in this way is unclear.To the extent
that the demand for capital goods was subsidized directly, the measured rela-
tive market price for capital goods should have risen as in Table 1.The
shift in demand to capital goods should have raised the rental rate on existing
capital.However, the subsidy should have lowered the rental rate relevant
to entrepreneurs as the new capital entered production.The ultimate effect
of this policy on the rental-wage ratio is unclear.Also, to the extent that
supply of capital goods was subsidized, the measured relative market price
should have fallen.
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tive market price for capital goods should have risen as in Table 1. The
shift in demand to capital goods should have raised the rental rate on existing
capital. However, the subsidy should have lowered the rental rate relevant
to entrepreneurs as the new capital entered production. The ultimate effect
of this policy on the rental-wage ratio is unclear. Also, to the extent that
supply of capital goods was subsidized, the measured relative market price
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2.lHoweverreal balances were reduced by the gradual withdrawal from
circulation of the emergency money, the gold loans, and the foreigii currency
which had constituted part of the media of exchange during the inflation.
See Bresciani-Turroni (pp. 348-9).
22Forthe Reichsbank's viewpoint in making this policy change, see
Schacht (pp. 152-162). Schacht states, "Not only the currency, but also
the belief in the currency was made stable by this action on the part of the
Reichsbank; and the belief was not evoked by long argument and persuasion,
but imposed by the act" .157).
23Fora description of the clay money and month money markets, see
Northrop (p. 126).
441n Flood and Garber (1980) we presented evidence that agenis must
havebeen almost certain that a reform would take place just prior to the
actual reform in November, 1923.We assumed that the reformed monetary
process was non-inflationary for the purpose of our analysis; but the new
process could also have been inflationary, as long as it was process consistent.
25 . . . . Thisis the opinion of Bresciani-Turroni (p. 406) and Schacht (pp. 152-3)..
See also Flink p. 124).
26The Rentenmarkswere phased out during the next 10 years and replaced
by Reichsmarks.
27Northrop(pp. 28-38) describes in detail the law regulating the
Reichsbank.Angell (pp. 61-81) describes the Dawes Plan.See also Flink
(pp. 126—49).
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28Thetotal foreign lending by the end of 1924was about 1200-1500
million Reichsmarks.See Schmidt (p. 32) or Northrop (p. 176).The official
loan was used to pay most of thereparations due for the year 1924-5;see
Angell (p. 69).
29Amongthemechanisms mentioned are positive "psychologicalfactors"
(Northrop,p. 176), (Schmidt, p. 32), sales of interests in business firms
to foreigners (Schmidt,p. 32), irrational employment of foreign credits
and a continued speculative spiriton the part of entrepreneurs (Bresciani-.
Turroni,p. 406, p. 309), disorganization of the German capital markets and
a resulting continuation of the financing ofunproductive investment (Flink,
p. 153).Funk (pp. 150-171) devotesa chapter to the question.However,
the exact mechanism for thispostponement remains sketchy.
30Bresciani-Turroni(p. 406) contends that most of the bankruptcies
occurred in firms formed during, the inflation.
31Bresciani-Turronj(pp. 388-90);Angell (pp. 82-139).
32ido not know if changes in unemploymentcompensation encouraged this
increase, as in the Britishcase.
33Bresciani-Turronjquotes from the Report of the Deutsche Bankfor
1926:"This crisis is not due toa change in circumstances, but is essentially
a phase in the process of deflation which Germaneconomic conditions is
undergoing after the monetary stabilization."
Graham (pp. 290-91) is notsure whether the 1925-6 downturn should
be attributed to the stabilization.Graham is of the opinion that, aside
from questions of income distribution,Germany gained on net from the hyper-
inflation; so he tends to minimizethe connection of this downturnto the
inflation.For Bresciani-'Furroni's opinionof Graham, see Bresciani—Turronj,
(p.401,note)
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34Nordoes it imply that these costsarose from the reform itself.In
Flood and Garber (1980) we argue that thereform was endogenous.The inflation
had become so extreme in autumn, 1923that failure to end it imnediately would
have caused the collapse either of thestate or of the monetary economy.
35Becauseof its extreme rates of inflation, there issome doubt that
the German episode can greatly illuminatecurrent discussions aimed at reducing
a 10-20 percent/year inflation rate.First, the current inflation is not
proceeding at such a high rate that it threatensthe continued existence of
the state or of the monetaryeconomy.Since it is not absolutely imperative
that the Fed put an end to the inflation,agents' beliefs about the nature
of the money supply processcan lag far behind an anti-inflationary shift in
policy.Second, there is a different set of institutionalarrangements under
mild inflation.As an example,.the overlapping contract literature isirrelevant
for analyzing the real effect ofa switch to stable prices from hyperinflation;
wage contracts, which had a very short life,were almost continuously re-
negotiated.See International Labour Office (pp. 44-73) fora detailed
description of such contracts in the Germancase.The sudden end of the
inflation could have had real effects throughthis channel only for a week
or two.
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that the Fed put an end to the inflation, agents' beliefs about thenature
of the money supply process can lag far behind ananti-inflationary shift in
policy. Second, there is a different set of institutional arrangements under
mild inflation. As an example,the overlapping contract literature is irrelevant
for analyzing the real effect of a switch to stable prices fromhyperinflation;
wage contracts, which had a very short life, were almost continuously re-
negotiated. See International Labour Office (pp. 44-73) for a detailed
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